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Economistshavemadeadistinctionbetweenrisk(whereprobabilitiesareobjectivelyknown)andam-
biguity(where probabilities are unknown). Until recentlyit was not clear howto model thisformally.
Schmeidler (1989) has proposed an axiomatic decision theory, which is able to model ambigu-
ity. In this theory, the decision-maker’s beliefs are represented by a capacity (non-additive subjective
probability) and (s)he is modelled as maximising the expected value of utility with respect to the
capacity. Ambiguity is represented by strictly non-additive capacities. The expectation is expressed
as a Choquet integral (Choquet (1953-4)). Schmeidler’s theory will henceforth be referred to as
Choquet expected utility (CEU).
A number of researchers have applied CEU (or related theories) to games1. Most of these papers
consider strategic (normal) form games. Lo (1999) suggests an equilibrium concept for extensive
form games underambiguity. Sinceheusesthe relatedmultiple-prior expectedutilitytheory tomodel
ambiguity,hediscussesanumberofconceptualproblemswhichariseinthecontextof dynamicgames
if players face strategic ambiguity. The paper contains many instructive examples but no general
theorems about existence of equilibrium if players face ambiguity.
Approaching the problem of extensive form games in a very general way, Lo (1999) cannot
exploit one of the strengths of non-additive probabilities, namely that unlike additive probabilities,
they canbe updatedafter events witha capacity value of zero. Inthepresent paper, we apply CEU to
sequential two-player games. This class of extensive form games comprises many important game-
theoretic models in economics such as signalling games, two-stage industrial organisation models
or bargaining problems. Restricting ourself to this class of games allows us to ignore some of the
consistency problems encountered in Lo (1999).
Inextensiveformgames,updatingofbeliefsonnewlyacquiredinformationisimportant. If beliefs
are represented by additive probabilitydistributions, then Bayesian updating is the natural method to
incorporate the information obtained from the observed moves of the opponents. Bayesian updating
however is possible only at information sets which have a positive probability of being reached.
As is well-known, play at information sets off the equilibrium path can have a major effect on the
equilibriumitself. Thusit is important to determineplayers’ beliefs atsuch informationsets. Because
1 See Dow & Werlang (1994), Eichberger & Kelsey (2000), Hendon et al (1994), Klibanoff
(1996)), Lo (1996) and Marinacci (2000).
2Bayesian updatingputs no restrictions on such beliefs,a multiplicity of equilibria is compatible with
Bayesian beliefs.
Games with incomplete informationare usuallyplagued byalarge number ofBayes-Nashequilib-
ria. Signallinggamesinparticularhavetypicallyanexcessivelylargenumberofequilibriabecausethe
signal space is large compared to thetypespace,which implies that most actions will not beobserved
inequilibrium. Themultiplicityofequilibria dependsonthelack ofconstraintsonout-of-equilibrium
strategies. There is a huge literature in game-theory which tries to impose further constraints on be-
liefsby additional rules about howa player shouldinterpret out-of-equilibrium moves in equilibrium.
Such constraints onbeliefs refine the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria. CompareMailath(1992) for a
survey of refinements in the context of signalling games. Most refinements have been based on for-
ward or backward induction arguments. Acommon criticism of such arguments is that, if the initial
situation is indeed an equilibrium, then players should conclude from a deviation that the opponent
is not rational or does not understand the structure of the game.
In this paper, we propose a definition of equilibrium where players have non-additive beliefs and
use an updating rule proposed by Dempster and Shafer in the literature for capacities. This equilib-
rium notioncomprisesBayes-Nashequilibriumasaspecial case. TheDempster-Shafer updatingrule,
whichis part of ourequilibrium concept, has well-defined updated capacities off the equilibrium path
aslongasthereisambiguity. Capacitiescanbefurtherconstrainedbyadequateassumptionsabout be-
liefswithout affectingconsistencyof beliefs in anequilibrium under ambiguity. Hence, thereisroom
to put constraints on beliefs which may be specific to situation one wants to model. For example,
one can exogenously determine the degree of ambiguity or one can restrict beliefs to agree with an
additive prior distribution, if one wants to model a situation where players are completely confident
about the distribution of types but ambiguous about their opponents’ strategic behaviour. It is possi-
ble to control for the ambiguity of a situation in experiments in order to see how it affects decision
behaviour. For individual decision situations,suchexperiments have beenperformed(Camerer &
Weber (1992)). There are few experiments so far, which focus on strategic ambiguity, but we are
confident that such tests can be conducted.
One can parametrise the notion of ambiguity and demonstrate existence of equilibrium for any
exogenously determined level of ambiguity. This opens up the possibilitytostudysequencesof equi-
libriaunderambiguitywhichconvergetoaBayesianequilibriumasambiguityvanishes. Assumptions
3about beliefs under ambiguitywill determinewhich Bayesianequilibrium will be selected. An inter-
estingaspect of this approach is, evenina Bayesian equilibrium,beliefsoff the equilibrium path may
be represented by capacities which are not additive. The greater freedom of modelling beliefs under
ambiguity provides a novel and useful modelling device for economic applications.
Insection2weintroducetheCEUmodelanddemonstratesomepropertiesofCEUandtheDempster–
Shafer updating rule. Section 3introduces our solutionconcept fortwo-stage games underambiguity
andrelates it tosome existing solutionconcepts. Section4 studieslimits of sequences ofequilibria as
ambiguity vanishes. We showthat ambiguous beliefs can select among Bayesian equilibria. Section
6 concludes the paper. All proofs are gathered in an appendix.
2. CEU PREFERENCES AND DS-UPDATING
In this section we consider a finite set S of states of nature. A subset of S is referred to as an event.
The set of possible outcomes or consequences is denoted by X. An act is a function from S to X.
The space of all acts is denoted by A(S) := faj a : S ! Xg. The decision-maker’s preferences
over A(S) are denoted by <.
A capacity or non-additive probability on S is a real-valuedfunctionº on the subsets of S; which
satisfies the following properties:
(i) A µ B implies º(A) 6 º(B);
(ii) º(?) = 0; º(S) = 1:
The capacity is said to be convex if for all A;B µ S; º(A[ B) > º(A) + º(B) ¡ º(A \ B):
Representingbeliefsby a convexcapacity is compatible with experimental evidence (see Camerer
& Weber (1992)) and is commonly used in applications of CEU to model ambiguity averse be-
haviour. We shall assume that all capacities are convex.
We shall use capacities to represent the beliefs of players. In game-theoretic applications, the
opponents’ strategy combinations will be the relevant states for a player. It is possible to define an
expected value with respect to a capacity to be a Choquet integral (Choquet (1955)).
For any function Á : S ! R and any outcome x 2 X let B(xjÁ) := fs 2 S : Á(s) > xg be the
eventinwhichÁisgreater thanor equal tox: Similarly,denotebyB(xjÁ) := fs 2 S : Á(s) > xg the
event in which Á produces a strictly greater outcome than x: The Choquet integral of Á with respect





x ¢ [º(B(xjÁ)) ¡ º(B(xjÁ))]; (1)
where the summation is over the range of the act, Á(S) := fx 2 Xj 9 s 2 S; Á(s) = xg:
We shall assume that preferences may be represented by Choquet expected utility (CEU) with
respect to a capacity, i.e.





Such preferences have been axiomatised by Gilboa (1987) and Sarin & Wakker (1992).
Definition 2.1 The degree of ambiguity of capacity º is defined by
¸(º) := 1¡ min
AµS
(º(A) +º(SnA)):
This definition is adapted from Dow & Werlang (1992). It has been justified epistemolog-
ically by Mukerji (1997). The degree of ambiguity is a measure of the deviation from additivity.
For an additive probability ¸(º) = 0, while for complete ambiguity ¸(º) = 1. The following re-
sult confirms that the degree of ambiguity is a reasonable measure of deviation from additivity, for
convex capacities2.
Lemma 2.2 If a convex capacity º has zero degree of ambiguity then it is additive.
2.1 The support of a capacity
Ingametheory,players areassumed tomaximise theirexpectedpayoffs. Strategychoicesareconsid-
ered in equilibrium if beliefs are consistent withactual behaviour. The strongest form of consistency,
Nash equilibrium, requires players’ beliefs to coincide with their actual behaviour. In an alternative
and equivalent definition of Nash equilibrium the strategies in the support of the opponents’ beliefs
about a player’s behaviour must be best responses of that player. In other words, players expect their
opponents to play only best-response strategies.
Ifdecisionmakers’ambiguityismodelledbycapacitiesthenthereareseveralconceptsofasupport
which all coincide with the usual notion of support in the case of additive capacities. In this paper
we will use the following definition.
2 The lemma is false if convexity is not assumed. A counter-example wouldbe the class of symmetric capacities studied
by Gilboa (1989) and Nehring (1994).
5Definition 2.3 Asupport ofacapacityºisanevent A µ S suchthat º(SnA) = 0andº(SnB) > 0;
for all events B ½ A:
Thisdefinitionof thesupportisduetoDow & Werlang (1994). Above wedefine thesupport
of a capacity to be a minimal set whose complement has a capacity value of zero. This is equivalent
to the usual definition of support (i.e. a minimal set of probability one) for an additive capacity but
will generally yield a smaller set if the capacity is not additive.
With this support notion every capacity has a support. However it has been criticised because the
support is not necessarily unique and states outside the support may affect decision making if a bad
outcome occursonthem. In Eichberger & Kelsey (2001a)weprovideanextensive discussion
of various support notions for capacities suggested in the literature
3. In particular, we show that the
support is unique if and only if one requires in addition º(B) > 0; for all events B in the support.
Adding this requirement toDefinition2.3guaranteesa uniquesupport but thereareconvexcapacities
for which no such support exists. In game-theoretic applications, the lack of uniqueness poses no
problem because we show the existence of an equilibrium in which beliefs have a unique support.
Moreover, ourresultsandexamples all have uniquesupports, whichsatisfythisadditionalrestriction.
More substantial is the objection to Definition 2.3 that states outside the support are not Savage-
null. An event E is Savage-null if outcomes on E never affect a decision, i.e. if aEc » bEc for all
acts a;b;c; where aEcdenotes an act which yields a(s) for all states in E and c(s) in all other states.
We believe that this argument is not appropriate in game-theoretic applications. We will argue this
case below in context with the game-theoretic equilibrium concept, which we advance in this paper.
2.2 CEU preferences and DS-updating
In sequential games players may receive information about the opponents by observing their moves
in earlier stages of the game. In particular in signalling games, second-stage players will try to infer
informationabout characteristicsoftheiropponentsfromthesignalswhichtheyreceive. Itistherefore
necessary to specify a rule for how to revise beliefs represented by capacities in the light of new
information.
If beliefs are additive, Bayes’ rule is the unique updating rule which maintains additivity. As in
the case of the support,with non-additive capacities thereare several updatingprocedures, which all
3 Haller (2000), Marinacci (2000) andinparticular Ryan (1999)discussandarguefor othersupportnotions.
6coincide withBayesianupdatinginthecase ofadditivity. Gilboa & Schmeidler (1993)provide
an exposition and an axiomatic treatment from a behavioural perspective. In this paper we choose
the Dempster-Shafer belief revision rule (see Shafer (1976)).
Definition 2.4 Dempster-Shafer revision
The Dempster-Shafer revision of capacity º given event E ½ S is
º(FjE) :=
º((F \E)[ (SnE))¡ º(SnE)
1¡ º(SnE)
: (2)
The axiomatisation by Gilboa & Schmeidler (1993) shows that the Dempster-Shafer rule
(DS-rule) may be interpreted as a pessimistic updating rule. If one views capacities as constraints
on a set of additive probability distributions then it is equivalent to a maximum likelihood updating
procedure.
For extensive-form games the DS-rule is particularly interesting, since it may be defined even
whenº(E) = 0. Ifthe eventE;about whichthedecisionmaker obtains information,wasambiguous,
º(E)+º(SnE) < 1;thentheDS-rulewillbewell-definedevenif it hasaprior capacityvalueof zero.
Thus,itmaybepossibletoupdatenon-additivebeliefsoneventswithacapacityvalueof zero. Wewill
argue in Section 4 that this property of DS-updating provides an approach to equilibrium selection
based on ambiguity of players. Contrary to the refinements of Bayes-Nash equilibrium based on
second-order reasoning about out-of-equilibrium moves, which dominate the literature, ambiguity-
relatedrefinementscanbegivenabehavioural contentwhichisindependentoftheequilibriumnotion.
3. SEQUENTIAL TWO-PLAYER GAMES
In this paper we will consider two-player games with complete and incomplete information, where
players move sequentially. Without loss ofgenerality,wewill assumethroughoutthat player 1moves
first and that player 2 knows the move of player 1 when she makes her move. Player 1 may have
one of several types which are described by a finite set T: If T contains a single type the game has
completeinformation,otherwiseitisofincompleteinformation. Beliefsabout typeswill bedescribed
below. Both players choose actions from finite action sets Ai; i = 1;2: Their payoffs are described
by the utility functions ui(s;a;t); i = 1;2:
Strategies of player 1 coincide with actions, S1 := A1: In contrast, player 2 who observes the
action of player 1 can condition her moves on this observation. Hence, S2 := fs2j s2 : S1 ! A2g
7denotes the strategy set of player 2, which is also finite because the action sets of both players are
finite. We will denote by s2(s1) 2 A2 the action, which player 2 will choose in response to s1
according to her strategy s2:
Both players hold beliefs about the opponent’sbehaviour which are represented by convexcapac-
ities. Player 1has beliefs º2 about thestrategies inS2; which player 2 will choose. Abelief º2 onS2
of player 1 about player 2’s strategy induces a set of beliefs fe º
2
jj s1
j 2 S1g about the actions in A2;
whichplayer 2 will chooseinresponse toa strategy s1
j 2 S1 : e º
2
j(E) := º2(fs2 2 S2j s2(s1
j) 2 Eg):
For notational convenience we will state definitions and results in terms of º2 though the respective




Player 2 has to form beliefs about strategic behaviour of the possible types of player 1. Beliefs
of player 2 about player 1’s type-contingent strategy choices are represented by the capacity º1 on
S1 £ T: These beliefs represent jointly this player’s ambiguity about type and strategy
4. In game-
theoretic applications it is usually assumedthat prior beliefs about types are commonknowledge and
additive. We canconstrainº1tobecompatiblewith anexogenouspriordistributionovertypes,which
is represented by a (possibly additive) capacity ¹ on the type space T:
Definition 3.1 A capacity º on S1 £ T agrees with the capacity ¹ on T if, for any subset T0 of T,
º(S1 £ T0) = ¹(T 0):
Whetherthepriorbeliefof player 2,º1;agreeswith aprior distributionontypesornot,onceplayer
2observes the action s1; which player 1 chooses shewill have to reviseher beliefs in the light of this








1g £ T) (3)
=
º1((fs1g£ T 0) [((S1nfs1g)£ T))¡ º1((S1nfs1g)£ T)
1 ¡ º1((S1nfs1g) £ T)
to denote the DS-updated capacity of the event T0 ½ T if the action s1 has been observed. This
DS-update is well-defined if º1((S1nfs1g) £ T) < 1 holds. This condition is satisfied if
² either player 2 feels ambiguity about player 1’s choice of the strategy s1, i.e.,
the event fs1g £T is ambiguous, i.e. if º1(fs1g £ T) + º1((S1nfs1g) £ T) < 1;
² or player 2is certain that player 1 will play strategy s1 with positive probability, i.e.,
4 Here we follow the approachof Milgrom & Roberts (1986) for the representation of games under incomplete
information.













bethe CEU-payoff of player 1and 2 respectively. The belief ½ about player 1’s type will either be º1
or º1(¢js1); depending on whether beliefs are formed by DS-updating or not.
3.1 Dempster-Shafer equilibrium
In order to see the relationship between the Dempster-Shafer equilibrium concept, which will be
proposedinthis section,with the familiarnotion ofa Perfect BayesianEquilibrium,consider the case
of additive capacities ¼1 and ¼2 representing players’ beliefs.
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) with prior distribution p on T is
² a probability distribution ¼1 on S1 £ T such that
P
s12S1
¼(s1;t) = p(t) for all t 2 T;
² a probability distribution ¼2 on S2;
² anda family of probability distributions f¹(¢js1)gs12S1 on T such that:




¼2(s2) ¢ u1(e s1;s2(e s1);t);




¹(tjs1) ¢ u2(s1;e a;t);









The standard interpretation is that ¼1(s1jt) :=
¼(s1;t)
p(t) ; ¼2(ajs1) := ¼2(fs2 2 S2j s2(s1) = ag) are
behaviour strategies and ¹(¢js1) are beliefs at the information set reached after move s1: Behaviour
strategies are identified with beliefs of players. Note that the belief interpretation requires ¼1 to be
the belief of player 2 about the behaviour of player1 and vice versa.
Without thefamilyofprobabilitydistributionsf¹(¢js1)gs12S1; conditionsPBE-aandPBE-bdefine
a Bayesian equilibrium if one uses ¼(s1;t) instead of ¹(tjs1) in PBE-b. Obviously, all PBE are
Bayesian equilibria. All a PBE requires in addition to the conditions of a Bayesian equilibrium is
9optimality of behaviour at information sets off the equilibrium path, i.e., after moves s1 such that
P
t2T
¼(s1;t) = 0; withrespect tosomearbitraryadditivebelief ¹(tjs1): Hence, it onlyrulesout strictly
dominated actions at such information sets. Since beliefs at information sets off theequilibrium path
are arbitrary, there are usually many PBE depending on the beliefs ¹(tjs1) assumed at information
sets off the equilibrium path.
This multiplicity of PBE poses a serious problem in games, where there are fewtypes of player 1
and many more strategies of this player, as it is typically the case in signalling games. The literature
is therefore particularly rich in refinements for signallinggames. Mailath (1992)provides agood
survey of the refinements applied in the context of signalling games. We show below in Example
4.2 how with ambiguity aversion, a quite natural assumption on beliefs can reduce this multiplicity
of equilibria.
Gamesinstrategicformwherethebeliefsofplayersarerepresentedbycapacitieshavebeenstudied
byDow & Werlang (1994), Marinacci (2000) and Eichberger & Kelsey (2000). In
the strategic form, beliefs (º1;º2) form an equilibria under uncertaintyif these beliefs have supports
containing only pure strategies which are optimal for the respective player given these beliefs.
In this paper we study sequential two-player games where the action of player 1 conveys infor-
mation to player 2. This requires a reformulation of the equilibrium concept. In contrast to the
equilibrium notion in the strategic form, we will require that player 2’s strategy consists of actions
that are optimal at each information set, i.e. after observing the action of player 1.
Definition 3.2 Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium (DSE)
ADempster-Shafer equilibrium consists of capacities º1 on S1£T; º2 on S2 and afamily ofcapac-
ities f½(¢js1)gs12S1 on T such that there are supports suppº1 and suppº2 satisfying:
a) (s1;t) 2 suppº1 then s1 2argmax
e s12S1
P1(e s1jt;º2);
b) s2 2 suppº2 then s2(s1) 2argmax
e a2A2
P 2(e ajs1;½(¢js1))
for all s 2 S1;
c) ½(T0js1) = º1(T 0js1) if º1((S1nfs1g)£ T) < 1:
(DSE)
In general, the support of a capacity need not be unique. Hence, a DSE requires us to specify a
10set of beliefs and some associatedsupport. In most applicationsthe capacities considered will have a
uniquesupportandthisseeminglyarbitrarychoiceof support for agivencapacity posesno problem
5.
Condition DSE-a of Definition 3.2 guarantees that only optimal type-contingent strategies of player
1 will be included in the support of player 2’s beliefs. Similarly, by condition DSE-b there are only
strategies in the support of player 1’ beliefs which prescribe optimal behaviour after a strategy of
player 1. We call the equilibrium a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium (DSE) because, according to DSE-
c, beliefs of player 2 about the type of player 1 are obtained by the DS-updating rule.
Remark: ADempster-Shaferequilibrium isdefinedasa setof beliefs overtype-contingentstrate-
gies (º1;º2) and a set of updated beliefs after strategy choices of player 1, f½(¢js1)gs12S1: By Con-
dition DSE-c the updated beliefs f½(¢js1)gs12S1 are however a derived concept. When referring to a
DSE we therefore often mention only (º1;º2); if there is no danger of confusion.
The degree of ambiguity¸(ºi); formally definedin the previous section, is aproperty of the equi-
librium beliefs (º1;º2). We will demonstrate below in Proposition 3.5 that one can take this degree
of ambiguity as an exogenous parameter and deduce equilibrium beliefs. The DSE concept is useful
for economic applications because one can study games under different degrees of ambiguity. Nash
equilibrium is a special case of an equilibrium under no ambiguity. Since the DS-updated capacity
½(¢js1) is a derived concept its degree of ambiguity ¸(º1(¢js1)) is also a derived property6.
We define the degree of ambiguity of a game to be the maximal degree of ambiguity of the equi-
librium beliefs. Formally, we will say that
² aDempster-Shaferequilibrium(º1;º2)hasdegreeofambiguity ¸ 2 [0;1]if¸ := maxf¸(º1);¸(º2)g;
and
² aDempster-Shaferequilibrium(º1;º2)agreeswiththeadditivepriordistribution ponT ifº1(S1£
ftg) = p(t) for all t 2 T:
If the beliefs of a DSE are additive, i.e., if there is no ambiguity, and if there is a common prior
distribution over types then a DSE is a Bayesian equilibrium.
The following proposition relates the Dempster-Shafer equilibrium concept tothe Bayesian equi-
5 There are, however, interesting cases where supports are not unique, yet where there is only one support for each
capacity which is consistent with the optimality conditions DSE-a and DSE-b.
6 For specific types of capacities one can prove implications for the degree of ambiguity of their DS-update. Compare
Eichberger & Kelsey (1999).
11librium and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium notions.
Proposition 3.3
a) ADempster-Shafer Equilibrium (º1;º2) with a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0; for which the belief
of player 2, º1; agrees with the additive prior distribution p on T; is a Bayesian Equilibrium.
b) Consider a Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium (º1;º2) with a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0; for which
the belief of player 2, º1; agrees with the additive prior distribution p on T: If for each strategy
s1 2 S1 there exists a type t 2 T such that (s1;t) 2 suppº; then the Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium
(º1;º2) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Discussion of the DSE concept. Proposition 3.3 shows that Bayesian equilibrium and perfect
Bayesian equilibrium are special cases of a DSE if there is no ambiguity. There is mounting exper-
imental evidence that Nash equilibrium and its refinements do not yield good predictions of actual
behaviour in all games. Situations in which one finds consistent deviations from the Nash equilib-
rium hypothesis include bargaining, e.g. the ultimatum bargaining experiments (Roth (1995)),
coordination problems (Ochs (1995)),public goodsprovision(Ledyard (1995)), andsignalling
games (Brandts & Holt (1992,1993)). These findings pose a challenge to theory and call for
the investigation of modified equilibrium concepts. Some of these anomalies can be explained by
altruistic preferences, e.g. in the cases of public goods and bargaining. Even in these cases however,
it is difficult to account for all the observed phenomena by modifying preferences alone.
The approach we propose in this paper focuses on ambiguity about the behaviour of the opponent
players. We do not give up the idea that players maximise their expected payoff but we investigate
howambiguityabout thestrategicbehaviourof opponents affectstheequilibria of games. Ambiguity
about the opponents’ behaviour may arise by a number of reasons.
Traditionalgametheorymaintainsthat players deducebeliefsabouttheopponents’behaviourfrom
firm knowledge about the preferences of opponents. In games with incomplete information one re-
places knowledge about other players’ payoffs, with knowledge about the probability distribution
over possible types of payoffs. Though logically sound and completely consistent, modelling games
of incomplete information by probability distributions over type spaces assumes that players have
extremely high computational abilities.
Ambiguity about the strategic behaviour of the opponent players reflects the difficulty of settling
12one’s beliefs firmly on a particular probability distribution over types and their behaviour. This does
notimplythatplayersdonot careaboutthemotivationoftheopponentsorthattheydonotconsiderthe
possibility of different types of opponents. It means however that their behaviour may be influenced
by the fact that they do not feel certain about such inferences.
Ambiguous beliefs represented by capacities, allow us to model players who hold and process
information about their opponents in order to predict their behaviour but who, depending on the
situation, may feel more or less certain about these predictions. If ambiguity is about two or more
possiblecharacteristicsofanopponent thenbeliefs shouldbemodelledbyacapacityovertherelevant
typespace,ifambiguity concerns thecorrect descriptionof the situationingeneral it is best modelled
by ambiguity about the opponents’ strategy choices. Equilibrium concepts for ambiguous players,
like the DSE suggested here, provide also a unified framework, in which the completely consistent
beliefs of Nash equilibrium analysis as well as behaviour influenced by ambiguity can be analysed.
3.1.1 Ambiguity about the strategy choice of the opponents
In traditional game-theoretic reasoning, players trust completelytheir reasoning about the rationality
of their opponents. If players believe that an opponent’s strategy is strictly dominated, then they
will act on the presumption that this player will never choose this strategy. Similarly, strategies of
the opponents which are not in the support of the capacity representing a player’s belief should not
influence this player’s behaviour.
The following example illustrates that these properties are not true for DS-equilibria. In Example
3.1 there are two DS-equilibria, one which describes behaviour similar to the backward-induction
Nash equilibrium. The second DSE shows that strategies of the opponent with bad outcomes may
influence the decision of a player, even if the opponents strategy is strictly dominated and not in the
support of this player’s beliefs.
Example 3.1 Frivolous lawsuits
7
Bebchuk (1988) studies legal disputes where the plaintiff threatens to go to court even if the ex-
pected value of the court case is negative in order to extract a settlement offer from the defendant.
Figure 1 represents a stylised version of this situation. Once the potential plaintiff has threatened
to go to court the defendant, D; can make an settlement offer o which will be accepted or refuse to















Figure 1: Frivolous suit
make an offer, no; in which case the plaintiff, P; has to decide whether to drop the case, d; or to go
to court,c: The payoffs reflect the incentives of the players. If the defendant makes no offer, no; and
the potential plaintiff decides not to file the suit, d; both players receive a payoff of 1: If the plaintiff
goestocourt, c; both players obtain ¡1, whichreflects the negative expected value of the court case.
A settlement offer, which is accepted, yields the plaintiff a payoff of 3 and the defendant a payoff
of 0: The settlement yields the plaintiff a higher payoff than not going to court, the incentive for the
frivolous suit8.
This is a game with complete information where player 1, the defendant, has a single type t, the no-
tation of which is suppressed. Hence, (½(tjno);½(tjo)) = (1;1) in any DSE. Equilibrium beliefs for
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1)describes behaviourwhich issimilar tothebackwardinductionequilibrium in
8 This example is a slightly modified and parametrised version of the model in Bebchuk (1988), p. 441.
14the analysis without ambiguity. The equilibrium beliefs need however not be additive. The plaintiff
decides not to go to trial. Whether the defendant D will refuse a settlement or not depends on the
strength of the belief ®P that the plaintiff will drop the case. For ®P ¸ 1
2 the defendant will make
no offer, otherwise a settlement offer is made. Filing the suit becomes weakly optimal only if the
plaintiff is completely certain that the defendant will not refuse a settlement, ºD
i (fnog) = 0:
The second DSE (ºD
2 ;ºP
2) shows behaviour which cannot occur in a Nash equilibrium. In this case,
the plaintiff plans to drop the case if challenged. The defendant, on the other hand, feels sufficiently
ambiguous, ºP
2 (fdg) = ®P < 1
2; about the prediction that the plaintiff will not file a suit, suppºP
2 =
fdg; and will offer settlement. Such behaviour cannot be supported by a Nash equilibrium. Yet it
does not appear unreasonable. After careful consideration of the situation, the defendant may well
recognise the incentives of the plaintiff to drop the action. This conclusion depends however on
the correct perception of the situation as modelled by the game. If the defendant feels sufficiently
uncertain about this information she may be justified in offering settlement. Moreover, since the
defendant does not challenge the potential plaintiff, no information about the actual behaviour of the
plaintiff is generated. So one is also justified to call such a situation an equilibrium.
From Part (b) of Definition 3.2 it is clear that no strictly dominated strategy will be chosen in a
DSE.Therefore, onemaybe led to conclude that all DS-equilibria are backwardinduction equilibria.
Thisconclusion is falsehowever, astheDSE(ºD
2 ;ºP
2) inExample3.1 demonstrates. Ambiguity may
prevent players from choosingstrategies whichexposethemtosituationswheretheymight behurt by
astrictlydominatedchoiceoftheopponents. This maybeso, eveniftheydonotexpectthe opponents
to play strictly dominated strategies, if they do not trust this conclusion sufficiently.
Example 3.1 shows also that the DSE concept can describe behaviour, which is inconsistent with
the strict consistency requirements of a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, behaviour, as in equilibrium
(ºD
2 ;ºP
2 ); canoccur onlyif the worst outcome of an interactioncan influence the decision of aplayer
evenif itisoneventswhichareoutsidethesupport. Ifone wouldconstrainthesupportnotionto make
events outside the support Savage-null, i.e., irrelevant for the player, then this equilibrium woulddis-
appear.
This is obvious from the following lemma which has been proved in Ryan (1998) (Lemma 1,
p.34).
Lemma 3.4 LetºbeacapacityonasetS:AneventE ½ SisSavage-nullifandonlyifº(SnE) = 1:






would survive. Indeed, Lo (1996) (Corollary of Proposition 4, p. 468) shows that this is true for
all two-player games. Adopting such a strong notion of support therefore defeats the objective of
modelling ambiguity of players.
DSEoffers more possibilities tomodel economic situations than traditional Bayesian analysis be-
causeconsistencyrequirementsonbeliefsare weaker. Inour opinionthisadditional freedomisuseful
for modelling economic situations since it allows us to includeaspects of the economicenvironment,
whichareprecludedbyBayesiananalysis,but whichare supportedbyexperimentalevidenceorother
robust findings. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate these applications in depth.
3.1.2 Ambiguity andPessimism
With convex capacities, as we assume throughout this paper, ambiguity aversion is built into the
concept of the Choquet integral. This pessimism concerns however only events on which there is
ambiguity. DSE leaves us with more modelling options. DSE allows us to distinguish between the
preference of players for unambiguous choices and their pessimism in the face of ambiguity. For
example, if one would like to restrict ambiguity to an opponent’s strategic behaviour and considers
information about types as hard, one can model this by a capacity which agrees with an additive
prior distribution. In this case, pessimism is restricted to the behaviour of the opponent but not to
the probability over types. The following example which is due to Ryan (2002) illustrates such a
modelling option
9.
Example 3.2 (Ryan 2002)
Consider a signalling game with two players, i = 1;2; where player 1 can be one of two types
T = ft1;t2g: It is known that each type occurs with probability
1
2: Action sets for the two players are
A1 = fR;Lg and A2 = fU;Dg: Figure 2 represents the game.
9 This game has been advanced inRyan (2002) as anargument for a stronger support notion called‘‘robust support’’.
















































Figure 2: Ryan (2002)
It is easy to check that this game has a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium where
² player 1 of type t1 chooses L;
² player 1 of type t2 chooses R;
² player 2 chooses
U in response to L and R:
Ryan (2002) (p.12) argues that this equilibrium describes the only sensible behaviour in this game
because each type of player 1 has a strictly dominant strategy and player 2, knowing the strategy of
both types of player 1, maximises her payoff by choosing U: Moreover, the move U is also recom-
mended if player 2 is ambiguityaverse since it guarantees thecertainpayoff of 1no matter what type
player 1 turns out to be.
For a degree of ambiguity ® < 1
2; the following beliefs (º1;º2) are a DSE which agrees with the
additive prior distribution (p(t1);p(t2)) = (1
2; 1
2):
º1(f(t1;L)g) = º1(f(t2;R)g) = ® ¢ 1
2;
º1(f(t1;L);(t2;L)g) = º1(f(t1;L);(t2;L)g) = ® ¢ 1
2;
º1(f(t1;L);(t1;R)g) = º1(f(t2;R);(t2;L)g) = 1
2;
º1(f(t1;L);(t2;L);(t2;R)g) = º1(f(t1;L);(t2;L);(t2;R)g) = (1 + ®)¢ 1
2;
º1(E) = 0 for all other E ½ T £ S1;
and º2 is an additive probability distribution with º2(f(D;D)g) = 1:
17One checks easily that, for ® > 0, suppº1 = f(t1;L);(t2;R)g: The DS-updates are additive and
always well-defined: ½(t1jL) := º1(t1jL) = 1
2¡® and ½(t1jR) := º1(t1jR) = 1¡®
2¡®:
ComputingtheCEUpayoffsforthesebeliefsyieldsP1(Ljt1;º2) = P1(Rjt2;º2) = 1;P 1(Rjt1;º2) =
P1(Ljt2;º2) = 0 and
P2(e ajs1;º1) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
1 for e a = U
4 ¢ 1¡®
2¡® for e a = D for s1 = L
1 for e a = U
4 ¢ 1¡®
2¡® for e a = D for s1 = R
:
For ® < 2
3; D is the best response of player 2 no matter which strategy player 1 chooses, and L
and R are the best strategies for player 1 of type t1 and t2 respectively. Since the support of º1 is
f(t1;L);(t2;R)g and of º2 is fD;Dg; playing D is a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium.
For ® ¸
2
3; (U;U) is the best response of player 2 and the associated DSE yields the same behaviour
as the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Notice that the DS-updates º1(t1js1) equal the prior distribution for ® = 0; the case of complete
strategic ambiguity ¸(º1) = 1. For ® = 1; that is complete strategic certainty ¸(º1) = 0; the DS-
updates correspond to the Bayesian updates, º1(t1jL) = 1 and º1(t1jR) = 0:
If there is no strategic ambiguity, then player 1’s moves provide a perfect signal for the type of
player 1, i.e. suppº1 = f(t1;L);(t2;R)g; and player 2 will respond by choosing U in response.
With complete ambiguity about player 1’s strategy choice, player 2 will assess the likelihood of the
two types with the priorprobability 1
2:Based ontheexpectedpayoff with respect totheunambiguous
prior distribution player 2will findaction Doptimal, andnot U: Whethertheaction U or D is chosen
depends therefore on the degree of ambiguity which player 2 feels about the deduced equilibrium
behaviour. If ambiguity is low, ¸(º1) = 1 ¡ ® < 1
3; then player 2 will choose U and if ambiguity
is high she will choose D: The critical level which determines when the behaviour of player 2 will
change depends, of course, on the payoff of actions.
If a player feels great ambiguity regarding the strategy of the opponent but not with respect to
the prior type distribution, then DS-updating on the observed actions leads the player to disregard
the ambiguous strategy and to decide basedon the unambiguous prior. Facedwith strategic informa-
tion, a player who is extremely ambiguous about strategic information and unambiguous about type
18information will revert to the unambiguous information of the prior distribution
10.
Onecan,of course, questiontheassumptionabout theunambiguous prior distribution. Indeed,we
donotrequire that beliefs doingeneral agreewithunambiguous priors. It isaneasyexercisetocheck
that, with complete ambiguity about the prior distribution, the argument that pessimism commends
to play U in order to secure the constant payoff of 1 is correct.
3.2 Existence and properties of DSE
Since Bayesian equilibria are DS-equilibria with a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0, existence of a DSEis
guaranteed under the usual conditions. It is not clear however whether there exist DS-equilibria for
arbitrary degrees of ambiguity ¸ and arbitrary prior beliefs about types. Proposition 3.5 shows that
DS-equilibria exist under the usual assumptions for any degree of ambiguity.
Proposition 3.5 For any degree of ambiguity ¸ 2 (0;1) and anyadditiveprior probability distribu-
tion pon T; thereexists a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium with thisdegreeof ambiguity¸ whichagrees
with the distribution p onT:
Proposition 3.5 shows that the DSE concept can be applied in all cases, in which standard Nash
equilibria exist. Moreover, it shows that one can choose the degree of ambiguity ¸ exogenously as a
characteristic of a situation and still obtain DS-equilibria. This property is particularly important in
economic applicationswhereone wantstostudythe impact ofambiguityonthebehaviourof agents
11
Games with complete information, i.e., with a type space containing a single type, jTj = 1; form
an important special case to which one can apply DSE. The DSE (ºD
2 ;ºP
2) in Example 3.1 shows
that behaviour in DS-equilibria does not necessarily correspond to behaviour in backward induction
equilibria.
Backward induction in the presence of Knightian uncertainty has also been discussed by Dow &
Werlang (1994). This paper shows that if there is ambiguity, there are non-backward induction
equilibria in the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. These equilibria arise with large degrees
of ambiguity, which is compatiblewithour analysis. Dow & Werlang (1994) analyse games in
normal form. Our theory confirms their analysis with an extensive form solution concept based on
Knightian uncertainty. We believe that an extensive form solution concept is preferable, since DSE
10 Ryan (2002) considers the case ® = 1
2: In this case, the DSE predicts player 2toplay D: He sees a tension between
the interpretation of Choquet preferences as pessimistic and the preference for the action D which is risky rather than
playing U; an action yielding a constant outcome of 1.
11 Eichberger & Kelsey (2001, 2001b) studyapplications to economic problems.
19requires that equilibrium strategies are optimal when each move is made. A solution defined on the
normal form cannot do this.
4. DSEL AS A NASH EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT
InExample 3.1the DSE with littleor no ambiguity selects the backwardinduction equilibrium. With
no ambiguity ¸ = 0; Dempster-Shafer equilibria, where each strategy of player 1 is played by some
type,areperfect Bayesianequilibria (Proposition3.3). These results suggest that DSEequilibria with
ambiguitymayprovidereasonablerestrictionsonbeliefs, whichinthelimitas ambiguityvanishesse-
lect Bayesianequilibriawhicharerobust with respect toambiguity. Inorderto explorethis possibility
more formally we define a Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium Limit (DSEL).
Ambiguity may affect beliefs over types and beliefs over strategy choice. We do not want to
exclude the possibility that ambiguity extends also to ambiguity about types, but we will require
only ambiguity about strategies in order to allow for capacities which agree with an additive prior
distribution.
Condition A A DSE (º1;º2) is subject to strategic ambiguity if
º
1(fs
1g £ T) + º
1((S
1nfs
1g) £ T) < 1
holds for all s1 2 S1:
If a DSE is subject to strategic ambiguity, then the degree of ambiguity is strictly positive, even if
theequilibrium beliefsagreewith anadditivepriordistributionover types. Thus,ConditionAallows
ustoconsidersequencesofDempster-Shaferequilibriawithpositivedegreeofambiguitywhichagree
with a given additive prior distribution over types.
Definition 4.1 Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium Limit (DSEL)




f½n(¢js1)gs12S1) such that the degree of ambiguity ¸ tends to zero as n tends to infinity.
By Proposition 3.5 there exists a DSE ((º1
n;º2
n); f½n(¢js1)gs12S1) for any degree of ambiguity
¸n > 0; where, for all s1 2 S1; ½n(¢js1) is well-defined by the DS-updates º1
n(¢js1): By convexity of
the capacities, ºi
n(E) 2 [0;1]; for all events E µ Si; i = 1;2; and for all n: Since we consider finite
games, the sequence (º1
n;º2
n) is contained in [0;1]m; where m = jTj + jS1j + jS2j: Hence, for any
20sequence¸n ! 0theremustbeaconvergingsubsequence(º1
n;º2
n) ! (º1;º2)and½n(¢js1) ! ½(¢js1)
for all s1 2 S1: Thus, DSEL is always well-defined.
Notice that a DSEL requires also to specify a sequence of updated capacities f½n(¢js1)gs12S1:
Since we impose strategic ambiguity there exists always a supporting sequence of Dempster-Shafer
equilibria for which the updated beliefs f½n(¢js1)gs12S1 are well defined by the DS-updates. Even if
DS-updates are well-defined along the sequence of DS-equilibria, a DSEL ((º1;º2);f½(¢js1)gs12S1)
may have non-additive DS-updates ½(¢js1) for strategies s1; which are not played in equilibrium.
The following exampleshows that beliefs off the equilibrium path need not be additive. Inpartic-
ular, the sequence of DS-equilibria supporting a DSEL
² can be strategically ambiguous,
² agree with an additive prior distribution and
² have well-defined DS-updates.
Notice that a DSEL alsorequires the specificationof a sequence of updated capacities. Y et,as the
degree of ambiguity converges to zero, additive beliefs (º1;º2) obtain in the limit, but DS-updates
½(¢js1) may remain non-additive if strategy s1 is not played in the DS-equilibria of the supporting
sequence.
Example 4.1
Considerthesignallinggame,inFigure3. Thestrategyset of player 1isA1 = fL;Rgand ofplayer
2, A2 = fu;m;dg: There are two types of player 1, T = ft1;t2g, which occur with probability p1
and p2; p1 > p2 for concreteness.
Inany perfectBayesianequilibrium both types of player 1choose R; since anybelief ¹(¢jR) makes d
strictlydominatedfor player 2. But if player 2 plays d with probabilityzero, strategy Rstrictlydom-










1(t1;R) = p1; e º
1(t2;R) = p2; e ½(t1jR) = p1; e ½(t2jR) =
p2; e º
2(u) = 1; is behaviourally equivalent to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This DSEL is sup-
portedby asequences ofstrategicallyambiguousE-capacitieswhichagreewiththeprior distribution.







































Figure 3: Non-additive beliefs off the equilibrium path
There is however another DSEL (º1;º2) where the updated beliefs of player 1 are not additive. For
any ® 2 [0; 1
3); consider the following sequence of DS-equilibria:
E º1
n(E)
f(t1;L)g (1¡ ¸n) ¢ p1
f(t1;R)g 0




f(t1;L);(t2;R)g (1¡ ¸n) ¢ p1
f(t1;R);(t2;L)g (1¡ ¸n) ¢ p2
f(t1;R);(t2;R)g 0
f(t2;R);(t2;L)g p2
f(t1;L);(t2;L);(t2;R)g 1 ¡¸n +¸n ¢ ®
f(t1;R);(t2;L);(t2;R)g p2
















The DS-updated capacities ½n(t1jR) = º1
n(t1jR) = ® and ½n(t2jR)g = º1
n(t2js1) = ® are well-
defined, but strictly non-additive:
22Computing the CEU payoffs for the DSE (º1
n;º2
n); one easily checks that P1(Ljti;º2
n) = 1 > 0 =
P1(Rjti;º2
n) and, for ® < 1
3; P2(djR;½n) = 4 > 3 + 3 ¢ ® = P2(ujR;½n) = P2(mjR;½n) for all
n: Hence, the DSEL ((º1;º2);(½(¢jR);½(¢jL)));
º1(t1;L) = p1; º1(t2;L) = p2; additive
½(t1jR) = ®; ½(t2jR) = ®; non-additive
º2(d) = 1; additive
follows from this sequence of DS-equilibria as ¸n ! 0.
The DSEL (º1;º2) is interesting since beliefs off the equilibrium path are non-additive, even
though beliefs on the equilibrium path are additive. Since perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires that
beliefs be additive at all information sets, the expected payoff from u dominates the payoff from d.
DSEL, however, allows strict non-additivity off the equilibrium path, so that the certain payoff of 4
obtained from strategy d becomes more attractive. It is plausible that a player who has observed an
out-of-equilibrium move will have some doubts about his original theory of howthe game is played.
Thiscouldcause him tobecomeambiguity-averseas represented bythe non-additivityof the updated
beliefs. DSEL allows us to model ambiguity of aplayer as aconsequenceof havingtoupdate beliefs
on events with a capacity weight of zero.
Example 4.1showsalsothat therearefewconstraints ontheDS-updates. Indeed, DSE,and there-
fore DSEL, allow us to impose constraints on players’ beliefs directly and to deduce equilibrium
beliefs satisfyingthese constraints. This opens the opportunity to design experimentswhere ambigu-
ity is manipulated independently from the equilibrium play which one wants to test.
4.1 Properties of DSEL
In this section, we will compare the concept of a DSEL withBayesian and perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium. Since Bayesian and perfect Bayesian equilibria have an additive prior distribution over types
as a defining criterion we will restrict attention to Dempster-Shafer equilibria which agree with an
additive prior distribution throughout this section.
The capacities (º1;º2) of a DSEL are additive. So it is not difficult to prove that a DSEL is a
Bayesian equilibrium.
Proposition 4.2 A DSEL which agrees with an additive prior distribution over types is a Bayesian
equilibrium.
All DSEL are Bayesian equilibria. The potential of strategic ambiguity to select among the set
23of Bayesian equilibrium lies in the updated beliefs. Beliefs are generated by the DS-updating rule
in combination with constraining assumptions about equilibrium beliefs. A DSE does not tie down
the equilibrium beliefs as much as Nash equilibrium does. Hence, there is room for game-specific
constraints onbeliefsandattitudestowardsambiguity. Dependingontheapplicationonecanfocuson
theconsequencesof the degree ofambiguityaversion, ofambiguityabout types or ofothercharacter-
istics of beliefs. The DS-updates inherit their properties from these fundamental assumptions. To the
extent that one can control for the degree of ambiguity, ambiguity aversion and other characteristics
of an environment one may be able to test equilibrium properties in experiments.
One of theweakest refinements of Bayesian equilibriais aperfect Bayesian equilibrium. Bymak-
ing updated beliefs part of the equilibrium concept it guarantees optimising behaviour at all informa-
tion sets whether or not theywill be reached inequilibrium. Since perfect Bayesianequilibrium puts
noconstraint on out-of-equilibrium beliefs, it eliminatesonlyequilibria relying on strictly dominated
strategies at information sets off the equilibrium path.
A DSELallows for beliefsoff the equilibrium pathwhich are strictly non-additive. Hence, Exam-
ple 4.1shows that a DSELneednot be a perfect Bayesianequilibrium. One mayhowever conjecture
that a DSEL with additive updates f½(¢js1)gs12S1 at all information sets is a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium. We will show below in Proposition 4.3 that this is the case, indeed.
One may also conjecture that the restrictions on beliefs induced by the sequence of stategically
ambiguous Dempster-Shafer equilibria would rule out DSEL with additive updates f½(¢js1)gs12S1 at
all information sets where a player uses a weakly dominated action. This is however not true. For
every perfect Bayesian equilibrium it is possible to construct a sequence of strategically ambiguous
DS-equilibria, which agree on the additive prior over types and converges to this perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. Thisisalmost obviousifallinformationsetswillbereachedintheperfectBayesianequi-
librium. If there are information sets following actions which are not played in a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, then one can find a sequence of DS-equilibria in which the DS-updates are not defined
at these information sets. Hence, one can assign the off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs of the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium to those DS-equilibria. Thus, one can obtain even a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium where player 2 chooses weakly dominated strategies off the equilibrium path as a DSEL.
Proposition 4.3 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium andDSEL
(i) Every perfect Baysian equilibrium is a DSEL.
24(ii) A DSEL which agrees with an additive prior distribution is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if all
updates are additive.
DS-updates of a DSEL can, but need not, be additive. Proposition 4.3 shows that additive limits
oftheDS-updates is the crucial conditionforthetwo concepts to coincide. If DS-updates do not con-
verge toadditiveprobabilitydistributionsoff theequilibrium path, then strategic ambiguity, modelled
bythe DS equilibrium concept, provides a refinement of Nash equilibrium based on other principles
than standard refinements in the literature.
Mailath (1992) provides an excellent survey of the refinements most commonly used in sig-
nalling games. They all operate by restricting out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Justification for such re-
strictions is obtained by forward or backward induction arguments. There is an obvious tension in
such arguments because out-of-equilibrium behaviour is constrained by reasoning about behaviour
which will never be observed.
The DSEL provides an alternative approach to equilibrium selection. Modelling ambiguity about
theequilibrium strategychoicesdirectlyavoidsthetension in theinterpretation ofout-of-equilibrium
beliefs. Moreover,therearebehavioural theoriesbehindtheDS-updatingrule(Gilboa & Schmei-
dler (1993)) and the Choquet expected utility model (Gilboa (1987), Sarin & Wakker
(1993)). Assumptions about the behavioural foundations of this decision and updating model can
and have been tested independently from the equilibrium notion (Camerer, C. & Weber, M.
(1992)).
4.2 Out-of-equilibrium beliefs
Refinement oftheset of equilibriacan beobtainedby imposingadditionalrestrictions onthe players’
non-additive beliefs. As in the standard refinement literature, one can strengthen or weaken the ro-
bustness requirement imposedonBayesian equilibrium byputtingfurther constraintsonthe sequence
of ambiguous DS-equilibria which support it. In contrast to this literature such assumptions are in
principle testable.
DS-equilibria which are not perfect Bayesian equilibria are plausible, since they correspond to
cases in which player 2 is ambiguity-averse after observing an unexpected move. Example 4.1 il-
lustrates the potential of DSEL to select among Bayesian equilibria based on ambiguity about the
behaviour in case of an unexpected out-of-equilibrium move. Yet, even if we do not want to rely on
25non-additive beliefs off the equilibrium path, DSEL offers quite intuitive out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
It is impossible to develop here a complete theory of reasonable refinements based on ambiguity,
but the following example may provide some intuition. It is a simplified version of the education-
signalling model introduced bySpence (1973). It shows howambiguityimposes plausible restric-
tions on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs, whichselect the pooling equilibrium as thea unique DSEL
12.
The intuition about beliefs is as follows. A DSEL which agrees with an additive prior distribution
over types models a situation where aplayer feels ambiguity about the opponents’ behaviour but not
abouttheprior distributionovertypes. Thisisanaturalassumptionif pastexperiencehas providedin-
formation aboutthefrequencyof types but if thereis nowell-establishedwayof signalling privatein-
formation. Insucha situationsignallingis endogenousequilibrium behaviour. Anout-of-equilibrium
move indicates a break-downof the implicit understanding of equilibrium behaviour. In such a case,
it appears quite reasonabletoreturn to the ‘‘firm’’ information about the priordistributionover types.
Example 4.2 education signalling13
Consider two workers with different productivity,ÁH > ÁL: Aworker’s productivityis private infor-
mationbutitiscommonknowledgethattheproportionofhigh-productivityworkersisp:Workerswill
apply for a position in thefirm with a wage proposal. A worker canaskfor ahigh wage wH = ÁH; a
lowwage wL = ÁL;or the averagewagew = p¢ÁH+(1¡p)¢ÁL: Thefirmcan onlychoose toaccept
the application, a; or to reject it, r. In order to qualify for a high wage wH; a worker must present an
educationcertificate. ThestrategywH implies thattheworker has obtainedthis educationcertificate.
High-productivityworkers can obtainthecertificate at nocost, while low-productivityworkers incur
a cost of ¡2: We will assume throughout that the education costs of the low-productivity worker are
not justifiedby the productivity and wage difference, 0 < wH ¡wL = ÁH ¡ ÁL < 2.
Figure 4 illustrates the situation.
In the notation of Section 3, the game is described by S1 = fwH;wL;wg and S2 = fs2(s1)j
12 Notice that Example 4.2 is no contradiction to the result in Proposition 4.3. There are other DSELs corresponding to
the typical perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Spence signalling model.
13 This is a highly stylised version of the education signalling model by Spence (1973). For simplicity of the ex-
position, we have assumed that the education level is not a choice variable. A more general treatment of the education






























































¹ w;ÁL ¡ ¹ w
¹ w;ÁH ¡ ¹ w
Figure 4: Signalling game
s1 2 S1g and T = fH;Lg: It is easy to see that there are exactly two perfect Bayesian equilibria:
Worker Firm out-of-equilibrium beliefs
(i) ((wH;H); (wL;L)) (s2(wH); s2(wL); s2(w)) = (a;a;r); ¹(Hjw) = 0:
(ii) ((w;H); (w;L)) (s2(wH); s2(wL); s2(w)) = (r;a;a); ¹(HjwH) = ¹(HjwL) = 0:
For notational convenience, we haveonlynoted the equilibrium strategies. In terms of beliefs, aper-
fect Bayesian equilibrium (¼1;¼2;f¹(¢js1)g) is described by ¼1(wH;H) = 1; ¼1(wL;L) = 1 and
¼2(a;a;r) = 1 in case (i) and ¼1(w;H) = p; ¼1(w;L) = 1 ¡ p and ¼2(r;a;a) = 1 in case (ii).
Beliefs about all other strategies are zero.
Equilibrium (i) is the Pareto-optimal separating equilibrium selected by the intuitive criterion. Equi-
librium (ii) is the Pareto-optimal pooling equilibrium, which does not satisfy the ‘‘intuitive’’ belief
conditionthat wH > w couldonlycomefrom the high-productivity typesince onlythis player would
gain from such a deviation relative to the equilibrium payout.
Ifweassumethattheprior distributionoftypesishardknowledge, whileequilibriuminferences about
27behaviour areambiguous,thenonly behaviour ofthe pooling equilibrium(ii) canarise inaDSEL.We
will formalise this assumption about the beliefs by an E-capacity
14. E-capacities are a modification
ofsimplecapacities (or distortedprobabilities)which havea constant degree ofambiguity andwhich
allow for marginal distributions which are additive.
Fix a common degree of ambiguity ¸n for both players. Denote by ¹t
o(E) the capacity which equals
1for E = S1£T and0 otherwise andby ¹o(F) the capacityequalling1for F = S2 and0otherwise.
Acompact way to write the E-capacities based on additive probability distributions ¼1 and ¼2 is
² º1
n(E) := ¸n ¢ [p¢ ¹H(E) +(1¡ p)¢ ¹L(E)]+ (1 ¡ ¸n) ¢ ¼1(E) for E µ S1 £ T;
² º2
n(F) := ¸n ¢ ¹(F) + (1¡ ¸n)¢ ¼2(F) for F µ S2: (6)
E-capacities area convexcombinationbetween anadditive probabilitydistribution ¼i anda weighted
average of the capacities ¹t
o with weights equal to the probabilities of the prior distribution. Notice
that º1
n(E) + º1
n((S1 £ T)nE) = 1 ¡ ¸n and º2
n(F) + º2
n(S2nF) = 1 ¡ ¸n holds for all events
E 6= S1 £ T and F 6= S2: Thus, there is strict ambiguity if ¸n > 0 holds. E-capacities have also the
property that suppºi = supp¼i. The strategies in the support of the capacity, i.e., the strategies of
the opponents which must be optimal, are the strategies in the additive part of the E-capacity. Using
Equation 3, one can compute




¸n ¢ p+ (1¡ ¸n)¢ ¼1(s1;H)
¸n + (1¡ ¸n)¢ [¼1(s1;H) + ¼1(s1;L)]
:
For ¸n > 0; º1
n(Hjs1) is well defined even if ¼1(s1;H) + ¼1(s1;L) = 0 holds, i.e., if no type plays
strategy s1 in equilibrium. Notice also that for ¼1(s1;H)+ ¼1(s1;L) = 0; º1
n(tjs1) = p(t) coincides
withthepriordistribution. This means that aplayerwhoobservesan out-of-equilibrium moves1will
update her beliefs to the prior distribution. This property of an E-capacity which agrees with a prior
distributionappearssensibleif oneviews theknowledge aboutthetype distribution asfirmcompared
to the beliefs about strategy choices which represent just a consistency requirement for beliefs and
optimal actions.
It is easy to check that º1
n ! ¼1 and º2
n ! ¼2: Notice, however, that º1
n(Hjs1) ! pfor all s1: Hence,
in the limit, we have out-of-equilibrium beliefs ¹(HjwH) = ¹(HjwL) = p.
It remains to show that the beliefs in Equation 6 based on the additive probability distributions
¼1(w;H) = p; ¼1(w;L) = 1 ¡ p and ¼2(r;a;a) = 1 form a DSE. This is easily established since
14 Eichberger & Kelsey (1999) providea thoroughstudyof the properties of E-capacities andan axiomatisation.
15 An explicit computation is in Eichberger & Kelsey (1999).
28suppº1
n = f((w;H); (w;L))g; suppº2







n(s2(wH) = a) = 0 for s1 = wH
wL ¢ º1
n(s2(wL) = a) = (1¡ ¸n) ¢wL for s1 = wL
w ¢ º1










(wH ¡ 2) ¢ º1
n(s2(wH) = a) = 0 for s1 = wH
wL ¢ º1
n(s2(wL) = a) = (1 ¡ ¸n) ¢ wL for s1 = wL
w ¢ º1





> > > > > <
> > > > > :
[ÁL ¡ wH] ¢ [1 ¡ p] for e a = a
0 for e a = r if s1 = wH
[ÁH ¡ wL] ¢ p for e a = a
0 for e a = r if s1 = wL
p¢ ÁH +(1 ¡ p)¢ ÁL ¡ w = 0 for e a = a
0 for e a = r if s1 = w
:
Hence, choosing w is optimal for the worker of either type and accepting a wage offer w is optimal
for the firm. This establishes that the beliefs in Equation 6 form a DSE for any n: The resulting
DSEL is therefore
Worker Firm out-of-equilibrium beliefs
(iii) ((w;H); (w;L)) (s2(wH); s2(wL); s2(w)) = (r;a;a); ¹(HjwH) = ¹(HjwL) = p:
The equilibrium selection in the DSEL of Example 4.2 depends on the joint assumptions of an
unambiguous prior distribution overtypesanda degreeof ambiguity aversion¸n which,for eachstep
n; is the same for all events E ½ S1£T:Constant ambiguityaversion controlsfordistorted beliefs
16.
The result that out-of-equilibrium beliefs coincide withtheadditiveprior distribution is drivenby the
assumption that the prior distribution is unambiguously known. If this is the case, it makes sense
for a player to revert to the unambiguous information as implied by DS-updating, whenever an out-
of-equilibrium move occurs which invalidates the equilibrium behaviour prediction. In the game of
Example 4.2, this assumption about the prior distribution rules out the separating equilibrium. The
separating equilibrium would require complete trust in the equilibrium behaviour because a low-
productivity worker has an incentive to break away from the separating equilibrium and to propose
theaveragewagerather thanthelowwage. Toarguethat thefirmshouldassumethat anaveragewage
offer could only come from the low-productivity type would mean that the firm feels no ambiguity
about the behaviour of the workers.
16 To establish the result of Proposition 4.3 that every perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a DSEL we had to relax this
assumption of a constant degree of ambiguity in each step of the belief sequence supporting the DSEL.
29IncontrasttoBayesianequilibrium,DSEhasaupdatingrulewhichworksalsoforout-of-equilibrium
beliefs if there is some ambiguity about strategy choices. Reasonable assumptions about beliefs can
beimposed directly. For example, partial information can be assumedas in the case of a well-known
prior distribution in Example 4.2. Whether this is an appropriate assumption or not can be assessed
independent from the equilibrium, which is an advantage in economic applications.
5. CONCLUSION
We haveapplied the theoryof Knightian uncertainty to sequential games. Theevidence suggests that
there are occasions inwhichindividuals havelarge degrees of ambiguity. Despitethis we believethat
an interesting case is when the degree of ambiguity is small. Under this assumption, we have shown
that our definition of equilibrium is a refinement of Bayesian equilibrium, which is similar in spirit
toperfect Bayesian equilibrium but doesnot exactlycoincide with it. SinceDSEL is aspecial case of
Bayesian equilibrium, no irrational behaviour is introduced by considering non-additive beliefs. As
we have shown, even in the limit as beliefs converge to additive probabilities, significant deviations
from behaviour under subjective expected utility are possible off the equilibrium path. We believe
this is one of our main innovations.
Appendix A
Lemma 2.2: If a convex capacity º has zero degree of ambiguity then it is additive.
Proof. Supposethatº isnotadditive,thenthere exist A;B ½ S,suchthat A\B = ;andº(A[B) >
º(A) + º(B): Let C = Sn(A[ B). Then since the degree of ambiguity is zero:
1 = º(A[B)+ º(C) > º(A)+ º(B)+ º(C): (A-1)
By convexity, 1 = º((A [ B) [ (A [ C)) > º(A [ B) + º(A [ C) ¡ º(A): Since the degree
of ambiguity is zero, º(A [ B) = 1 ¡ º(C) and º(A [ C) = 1 ¡ º(B): Substituting, we obtain
1 > 1 ¡ º(C) + 1 ¡ º(B) ¡ º(A); but this contradicts A-1.
Proposition 3.3:
a) A Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium (º1;º2) with a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0; for which the
30beliefof player2, º1;agreeswiththeadditivepriordistributionponT isaBayesianEquilibrium.
b) Consider a Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium (º1;º2) with a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0; for
which the belief of player 2, º1; agrees with the additive prior distribution p on T: If for each
strategy s1 2 S1 there exists a type t 2 T such that (s1;t) 2 suppº; then the Dempster-Shafer
Equilibrium (º1;º2) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. Part (a): Since the DSE (¼1;¼2) has a degree of ambiguity ¸ = 0, by Lemma 2.2, ¼1 and ¼2
must be additive probability distributions. Since the DSE agrees with an additive prior distribution
p on T;
P






























t2T ¼1(s1;t) 6= 0: Note that beliefs off theequilibrium path ½(tjs1) are
arbitrary and need not even be additive. For actions s1 2 S1 such that
P
t2T ¼1(s1;t) = 0 all actions
a 2 A2 are optimal. Hence, Part (a) of Proposition 3.3 defines a Bayesian equilibrium with mixed
strategies (¼1;¼2):
Part(b): If,inaddition, foreachstrategys1 2 S1 there existsatypet 2 T suchthat(s1;t) 2 supp¼1;
then
P
t2T ¼1(s1;t) 6= 0 for all s1 2 S1 and ½(tjs1) =
¼1(s1;t) P
t2T ¼1(s1;t) is defined at all information sets.
In this case, (¼1;¼2) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Lemma3.4:Let º be acapacityona setS: Anevent E ½ SisSavage-null ifand onlyifº(SnE) = 1:
Proof. An event E is Savage-null if for any three outcomes x;y;z 2 X the CEU value of the acts
xEy and zEy are equal, i.e.
u(x) ¢ º(E) +u(y) ¢ [1 ¡ º(E)] = u(y) ¢ º(SnE)+ u(z) ¢ [1¡ º(SnE)]
where weassume,without lossofgenerality,u(x) > u(y) > u(z):This equalitycanholdforarbitrary
outcomes x;y;z 2 X with this order if and only if º(SnE) = 1 and º(E) = 0:
31Proposition 3.5: For any degree of ambiguity ¸ 2 (0;1) and any additive prior probability distri-
bution p on T; there exists a Dempster-Shafer equilibrium with this degree of ambiguity ¸; which
agrees with the distribution p on T:
Proof. The proof uses the special form of an E-capacity, which is extensively discussed in Eich-
berger & Kelsey (1999). E-capacities are modifications of an additive probability distribution
with a constant degree of ambiguity and, possibly, some additive marginal distributions. If there are
noadditivemarginals then E-capacities aresimplecapacities. Moreover,thesupport of anE-capacity
coincideswiththesupport of itsadditivepart. Hence, for given prior distributions of types and given
degrees of ambiguity, E-capacities are completely described by their additive part. Given beliefs
modelledby E-capacities, onecan usestandard arguments to showthat thereisa Nash-equilibrium in
mixed strategies for the modified game where the Choquet payoff functions are viewed as functions
of the additive part of the E-capacities.
Fix ¸
1;¸
2 2 (0;1) and any additive probability distribution p on T: For any finite set X denote by
¢(X) the set of additive probability distributions on X: Let ¢p(S1 £ T) be the set of additive prob-
ability distributions on S1£ T with marginal distributionp on T: This set is non-empty,compact and
convex.
For any E ½ S1 £ T let the capacity ºt be defined as
ºt(E) :=
½
1 if S1£ ftg ½ E
0 otherwise
;







p(t)¢ ºt(E) + (1¡ ¸
1) ¢ ¼(E): (A-2)
For any set T 0 ½ T; the DS-update of the capacity defined in Equation A-2 is (see Eichberger &
























1 > 0, º1
¼(T 0js1) is a continuous function of ¼:







be the set of best behaviour strategies on A2 for given history s1 and given belief º1
¼ based on ¼:
From the definition of the Choquet integral inEquation1, it is clear that P2(ajs1;º1
¼) is a continuous
function of the capacity º1
¼: From the DS-update in Equation A-3 we know that º1
¼ is a continu-




¼) is a continuous function of ¼: Hence, by Berge’s
maximum theorem (e.g., Takayama (1985), p. 254), ½(¼;s1) is a upper-hemi-continuous cor-
respondence. Since ¢(A2) is a convex set and since
P
a2A2
¾(a) ¢ P 2(ajs1;º1
¼) is linear in ¾; the
correspondence ½(¼;s1) is also convex-valued.
For any t 2 T and a vector ¹ = (¹(¢js1))s12S1 of additive probability distributions ¹(¢js1) 2 ¢(A2)
define the capacities º2
¹(Ejs1) := (1 ¡ ¸
2) ¢ ¹(Ejs1): The capacity º2












be the best-response correspondence for player 1. Finally, let






1); ¾t 2 Ã(¹;t)g: (A-6)
Since the Choquet integral P1(s1jt;º2
¹(¢js1))is continuous inº2
¹(¢js1); which in turn is continuous in
¹; we can conclude that
P
s12S1
¾(s1) ¢ P 1(s1jt;º2
¹(¢js1)) is continuous in ¹: Moreover, the objective
function is linear in ¾: Applying Berge’s maximum theorem again, we conclude that the correspon-
dences Ã(¹;t) are upper-hemi-continuous and convex-valued. The correspondence Á(¹) defined in
Equation A-6 is a convex set for each ¹ and clearly also upper-hemi-continuous.
Consider the mapping £ : ¢p(S1£ T) £ ¢(A2)jS1j ! ¢p(S1 £ T) £ ¢(A2)jS1j defined by
(¼;¹) 7! £(¼;¹) := £
s12S1 ½(¼;s
1) £ Á(¹):
As the Cartesian product of upper-hemi-continuous and convex-valued correspondences £ is itself
a upper-hemi-continuous and convex-valued correspondence. Moreover, the set ¢p(S1 £ T) £
¢(A2)jS1j is compact and convex. Hence one can apply Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem to estab-




¹¤(s2(s1)js1) for all s2 2 S2: For all E ½ S2; let º2
¿¤(E) := (1¡ ¸
2)¢ ¿¤(E):
33We claim that the capacities (º1
¼¤;º2
¿ ¤) are a DSE. To see this, note first that suppº1
¼¤ = fs1 2
S1j ¼¤(s1) > 0g and suppº2
¿¤ = fs2 2 S2j ¿¤(s2) > 0g (Eichberger & Kelsey (1999),
Lemma 2.2, p. 121). Hence, (s1;t) 2 suppº1
¼¤ implies ¼¤(s1;t) = p(t) ¢ ¾t(s1) > 0 and ¾t 2
Ã(¹¤;t): Hence, s1 must maximise P1(s1jt;º2
¹¤(¢js1)): Similarly, s2 2 suppº2
¿¤ implies ¿¤(s2) > 0:
Hence, ¹¤(s2(s1)js1) > 0for all s1 2 S1: Therefore, s2(s1) must be a maximiser of P2(ajs1;º1
¼¤):








2 were chosen arbitrarily,
the existence result follows for any ¸ 2 (0;1):
Proposition 4.2:A DSEL which agrees with an additive prior distribution over types is a Bayesian
equilibrium.
Proof. Note first that ¸ = 0 in the limit implies that the limit capacities (º1;º2) are additive proba-
bility distributions. Hence, suppº1 = f(s1;t) 2 S1 £ Tj º1(s1;t) > 0g and suppº2 = fs2 2 S2j
º2(s2) > 0g: Moreover, º1
n(s1;t) ! º1(s1;t) > 0 and º2
n(s2) ! º2(s2) > 0; imply º1
n(s1;t) > 0
andº2
n(s2) > 0for n large enough. Note also that P1(s1jt;º2) is continuous in º2 andP 2(ajs1;½) is
continuousin½:If º1(fs1g£T) > 0; i.e.,iftheDS-updateº1(tjs1)isdefined,then½(¢js1) = º1(¢js1).
Suppose now that (º1;º2) is not a Bayesian equilibrium. Then there exists (s1;t) 2 suppº1 such
that P1(s1jt;º2) < P1(e s1jt;º2) for some e s1 2 S1 and/or s2 2 suppº2 such that P2(s2(s1)js1;½) <
P2(e ajs1;½)for somee a 2 A2: By continuityof P1(s1jt;º2) and P2(ajs1;½) in ½ and º2; respectively,
we can conclude that P 1(s1jt;º2
n) < P 1(e s1jt;º2
n) for some e s1 2 S1 and/or P2(s2(s1)js1;½n) <
P2(e ajs1;½n) for somee a 2 A2: Since (s1;t) 2 suppº1 and s2 2 suppº2 implythat º1
n(s1;t) > 0and
º2
n(s2) > 0for n large, (s1;t) 2 suppº1
n ands2 2 suppº2
n follows. Hence, (º1
n;º2
n) is not a DSE.
Proposition 4.3: Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and DSEL
(i) Every perfect Baysian equilibrium is a DSEL.
(ii) A DSEL which agrees with an additive prior distribution is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if all
updates are additive.
Proof. Part(i). Theproofisconstructive. ForagivenperfectBaysianequilibrium(¼1;¼2;f¹(¢js1)gs12S1)




which converges to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The trick is to construct this sequence such
17 For more on E-capacities, their properties and updates, see Eichberger & Kelsey (1999).
34that the Dempster-Shafer-update of any strategy s1 which is not played by any type in the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, ¼1(fs1g£ T) = 0; is not defined, i.e., º1
n(S1nfs1g£T) = 1. Hence, one can
choosethe update ½n(¢js1) arbitrarily, in particular equal to the update ¹(¢js1) of the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. This sequence of capacities (º1
n;º2
n;f½n(¢js1)gs12S1) is a DSE by standard continuity
arguments.




all T0 µ T; ¼2 2 ¢(S2) with (additive) out-of-equilibrium beliefs ¹(¢js1) 2 ¢(T) for all s1 2 S1:
Define a sequence of DS-equilibria ((º1
n;ºn); f½n(¢js1)gs12S1) as follows:
Consider sequences ¸
1
n > 0 and ¸
2
n > 0 which converge to zero. Denote by S1
+ µ S1 the set of
strategies with
P
t2T ¼1(s1;t) 6= 0: For any non-empty E µ S1 and F µ T let
º
1
n(E £ F) =
(
1 if S1






p(t)¢ ºt(E £ F) +(1 ¡ ¸
1
n) ¢ ¼1(E £ F) otherwise ;
where
ºt(E £ F) :=
½
1 if S1£ ftg ½ E £ F
0 otherwise :
It is easy to check that º1
n is a capacity which,by construction,agreeswiththeprior distribution p(t):
Moreover, º1
n ! ¼1:
For s1 2 S1
+; S1
+ £ T * S1nfs1g £ T and º1
n(S1nfs1g£ T) < 1: Hence, the DS-updates º1
n(T0js1)
are well-defined and converge to the Bayesian updates . The updates ½n(¢js1) = º1
n(¢js1) are well-
defined and converge to ¹(¢js1):
On the other hand, for s1 = 2 S1
+ S1
+ £ T µ S1nfs1g£ T and the DS-updates are not defined. Hence,
we can choose ½n(¢js1) = ¹(¢js1) for all n in this case.
Finally, for any subset E ½ S2; º2












n) for all (s1;t) 2 suppº1
n and s2(s1) 2argmax
e a2A2




n);f½n(¢js1)gs12S1) is a DSE:
Part (ii). Consider a sequence of strategically ambiguous DSE (º1
n;º2
n) ! (º1;º2) and, for all
s1 2 S1; ½n(¢js1) converges to an additive update ½(¢js1). Since º1 is additive, (s1;t) 2 supp º1
implies º1(s1;t) > 0: Suppose there is a e s1 2 supp º1 such that P1(e s1jt;º2) > P1(s1jt;º2). By
continuity of P1 in º2; P 1(e s1jt;º2
n) > P1(s1jt;º2
n) for large n: Moreover, for large n; º1
n(e s1;t) >
350 and, therefore, e s1 2 supp º1
n. This contradicts the assumption that (º1
n;º2
n) is a DSE. Hence,
((º1;º2); f½(¢js1)gs12S1) satisfies Condition PBE-a.
Since½(¢js1)is additive,ananalogousargument showsthatConditionPBE-bmust holdfor((º1;º2);
f½(¢js1)gs12S1): Finally, if º1(fs1g£T) = 1¡º1((S1nfs1g)£T) > 0; thenº1
n((S1nfs1g)£T) < 1
for nlargeenough. Hence, all DS-updates are well-definedfor large n and½n(T0js1) = º1
n(T 0js1) !
½(T0js1) = º1(T0js1): Thus, Condition PBE-c is satisfied. Given the assumption that the DSEL
agrees with an additive prior distribution over types it is therefore a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
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